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THE ADMISSIBILITY OF NOVEL SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE: THE CURRENT STATE OF THE
FRYE TEST IN WISCONSIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently our courts have been inundated with a deluge of
novel scientific theories and techniques.' Much literature by
commentators has emerged relative to the standards to apply
when considering the admissibility of these theories and tech-
niques.2 Two approaches are frequently suggested: (1) the
* The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Adjunct Professor J. Ric
Gass, Marquette University Law School, for his guidance in the preparation of this
comment.
1. See Lacey, Scientific Evidence, 24 JURIMETRICS J. 254 (1984). Lacey describes
the magnitude of scientific evidence presently before the courts:
T]he admissibility at trial of scientific evidence lately has been much in the
news. Evidence of fiber analysis in the Wayne Williams/Atlanta case, the fiber,
hair and "bite mark" evidence in the Florida trial of Theodore Bundy, the psy-
chiatric testimony in the Utah trial of Francis Schreuder who claimed that his
intense love for his mother stifled his free will and prevented him rom disobeying
her order to kill his grandfather, and the recent Hinckley trial have heightened
public awareness of scientific evidence ....
In short, the scientific and technological subjects that now enter our courts
project us into the disciplines of Engineering, Medicine, Chemistry, Physics,
Toxicology, Anthropology* and Biology, and, as well, the social sciences: Sociol-
ogy, Economics, Psychology and Linguistics, Statistics and Accounting.
The reach of scientific evidence is dramatically illustrated by a recent survey
which indicated that 44 percent of the judges and attorneys questioned encoun-
ter scientific evidence in approximately one-third of their cases.
Id. at 254-55 (footnotes omitted).
2. See generally Comment, Scientific Evidence - Admissibility Fryed to a Crisp, 21
S. TEx. L.J. 62 (1981); Giannelli, The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence: Frye v.
United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM L. REv. 1197 (1980); Graham, Rele-
vancy and the Exclusion of Relevant Evidence: Admissibility of Evidence of a Scientific
Principle or Technique - Application of the Frye Test, 19 CRIM. L. BULL. 51 (1983);
Imwinkelried, A New Era in the Evolution of Scientific Evidence - A Primer on Evalu-
ating the Weight of Scientific Evidence, 23 WM. & MARY L. REv. 261 (1981); Im-
winkelried, Judge Versus Jury: Who Should Decide Questions of Preliminary Facts
Conditioning The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 577
(1984) [hereinafter cited as Imwinkelried]; Matthias, The Admissibility of Novel Scien-
tific Evidence In the Ninth Circuit, 19 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 533 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as Matthias]; McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Ad-
missibility, 67 IOWA L. Rv. 879 (1982) [hereinafter cited as M. McCormick]; Moen-
ssens, Admissibility of Scientific Evidence- An Alternative to the Frye Rule, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 545 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Moenssens]; Strong, Questions Affecting
the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 70 U. ILL. L.F. 1 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Strong]; Note, Expert Testimony Based on Novel Scientific Techniques: Admissibility
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 774 (1980) [hereinafter
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Frye3 test, and (2) the relevancy or "balancing approach" as
suggested by the Federal Rules of Evidence. 4 This comment
will trace the origin of the Frye test,' and examine the current
state of the Frye standard,6 its proponents, 7 adversaries, 8 and
application to newfangled scientific theories and techniques.9
Additionally, the article will examine Wisconsin's approach to
the admissibility of scientific evidence under Frye, ' 0 trace the
confusion created by the court's selective employment of the
"general acceptance"'" test, and conclude by urging a recom-
mitment to Frye.12
I. THE FRYE OPINION
Despite having encompassed a scant two pages in the Fed-
eral Reporter, Frye v. United States13 continues to be the most
frequently cited authority respecting the admissibility of scien-
tific evidence.' 4 Associate Justice Van Orsdel wrote the opin-
ion for the court which, in a case of first impression, examined
the admissibility of an ultramodern scientific instrument -
the "systolic blood pressure deception test." This device was
the forerunner of our modern day polygraph test.
James Alphonzo Frye was convicted of the second degree
murder of a wealthy physician found shot to death in his of-
fice.' 5 The only issue on appeal was the admission of testi-
cited as Note, Expert Testimony]; See also Symposium on Science and the Rules of Evi-
dence, 99 F.R.D. 187 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Symposium Report].
3. See infra notes 13-30 and accompanying text. In this comment the words Frye
and general acceptance will be used interchangeably.
4. See infra notes 45-62 and accompanying text. This article will deal primarily
with the Frye "general acceptance" test and hence will mention the relevancy or "bal-
ancing approach" in only a summary fashion.
5. See infra notes 13-20 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 21-30 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 31-42 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 63-119 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 120-42 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 153-57 and accompanying text.
13. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
14. According to a recent SHEPARIYS SUPPLEMENT, Frye has been explicitly men-
tioned 518 times in case law. Also, Frye has been the subject of praise and scorn by the
commentators. See supra note 2.
15. For an interesting and detailed factual account of the Frye case, see Starrs, A
Still-Life Watercolor: Frye v. United States, 27 J. FORENSIC Sci. 684 (1982).
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mony of the expert who administered a deception test to the
defendant. The court related the scientific theory underlying
the deception test:
It is asserted that blood pressure is influenced by change in
the emotions of the witness, and that systolic blood pressure
rises are brought about by nervous impulses sent to the sym-
pathetic branch of the autonomic nervous system. Scientific
experiments, it is claimed, have demonstrated that fear,
rage, and pain always produce a rise of systolic blood pres-
sure, and that conscious deception or falsehood, conceal-
ment of facts, or guilt of crime, accompanied by fear of
detection when the person is under examination, raises the
systolic blood pressure in a curve, which corresponds exactly
to the struggle going on in the subject's mind, between fear
and attempted control of that fear, as the examination
touches the vital points in respect which he is attempting to
deceive the examiner.16
Frye underwent the deception test and defense counsel, in
an attempt to diminish his client's guilt, sought to introduce
the results of the examination. Justice Van Orsdel then wrote
what remains the rule in a majority of jurisdictions17 concern-
ing the admissibility of novel scientific evidence:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line
between the experimental and demonstrable stages is diffi-
cult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential
force of the principle must be recognized, and while the
courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony de-
duced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discov-
ery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in
the particular field in which it belongs.II
The Frye court went on to conclude "the systolic blood pres-
sure deception test has not yet gained such standing and scien-
tific recognition among physiological and psychological
authorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert tes-
timony deduced from the discovery, development, and experi-
ments thus far made." 1 9 Hence, the "general acceptance" test
was established. However, since the Frye opinion failed to in-
16. See Frye, 293 F. at 1013-14.
17. See Moenssens, supra note 2, at 546.
18. Frye, 293 F. at 1014 (emphasis added).
19. Id.
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clude any authority for the "general acceptance" language,
and likewise any definition of its terms, the test has often been
the source of heated debate among commentators although it
remains the majority rule.2°
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE FRYE TEST
Since its adoption in 1923, the Frye test, which requires
"general acceptance" within the scientific community, has
been determined to be the applicable standard in federal dis-
trict and state courts in a myriad of situations involving ad-
missibility of scientific techniques.21 In fact, one commentator
has stated "[s]ince the late 1960's, courts have cited Frye in
virtually every criminal prosecution dealing with a novel form
of expert evidence."' 22 Today, although the Frye test repre-
sents the majority rule, there seems to be a growing minority
of state supreme and federal district courts which have re-
jected the "general acceptance" test espoused in the Frye
decision.23
20. See infra notes 31-55 and accompanying text. However, even those critical of
Frye have had great difficulty defining with specificity an approach preferable to the
"general acceptance" test. See Symposium Report, supra note 2, at 229-33.
21. See, e.g., United States v. Tranowski, 659 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1981) (using astro-
nomical and mathematical calculations to date photographs); United States v. Fosher,
590 F.2d 381 (lst Cir. 1979) (expert testimony to demonstrate the unreliability of eye-
witness identification); United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977) (ion
microprobic analysis of hair); Rivers v. Black, 259 Ala. 528, 68 So. 2d 2 (1953) (Drunk-
ometer); State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 647 P.2d 1292 (1982) (rape trauma syndrome);
State v. Peoples, 227 Kan. 127, 605 P.2d 135 (1980) (human bitemark comparison);
Smith v. State, 31 Md. App. 106, 355 A.2d 527 (1976) (psychological stress evaluation);
People v. Wesley, 103 Mich. App. 240, 303 N.W.2d 194 (1981) (fingernail compari-
sons); State v. Sparks, 297 N.C. 314, 255 S.E.2d 373 (1979) (atomic absorption); State v.
Stewart, 116 N.H. 585, 364 A.2d 621 (1976) (polygraph test); State v. Cavello, 88 NJ.
508, 443 A.2d 1020 (1982) (formulating a psychological profile of rapists); People v.
Alston, 79 Misc. 2d 1077, 362 N.Y.S.2d 356 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (blood test); State v. Smith,
50 Ohio App. 2d 183, 362 N.E.2d 1239 (1976) (modified Harrison-Gilroy technique for
gunshot residue analysis); State v. Daniels, 37 Ohio App. 2d 4, 305 N.E.2d 497 (1973)
(trace metal detection technique); Henderson v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 45, 230 P.2d 495,
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 898 (1951) (sodium pentothal); Commonwealth v. Zazarovitch,
496 Pa. 97, 436 A.2d 170 (1981) (hypnotically refreshed testimony); State v. Canaday,
90 Wash. 2d 808, 585 P.2d 1185 (1978) (breathalyzer test).
22. See Moenssens, supra note 2, at 546.
23. See, e.g., United States v. Luschen, 614 F.2d 1164, 1169 n.3 (8th Cir. 1980)
(where court states it has not yet adopted Frye); United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d
1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978). See also Whalen v. State, 434 A.2d 1346, 1354 (Del. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 927 (1981); Brown v. Commonwealth, 639 S.W.2d 758, 760 (Ky.
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A. Proponents
One advocate of the Frye "general acceptance" test has
praised the standard claiming:
[t]he Frye standard serves two distinct but related values:
(1) general scientific acceptance provides a meaningful indi-
cation of reliability; and (2) it provides a judicially managea-
ble standard by which to avoid collateral issues during trial.
While the Frye standard requires the exclusion of some rele-
vant evidence, it saves time - not arbitrarily or unjustly, but
in a manner largely consonant with the principle that only
reliable evidence should be admitted. 4
Another legal scholar who favors Frye opined that the "gen-
eral acceptance" test acts to shield the awe-struck jury from
the nimbus which frequently surrounds novel scientific tech-
niques.25 Another argument frequently raised in favor of the
Frye test relates to the need for uniformity of judgment and
precedent, stemming from appellate court decisions, for reso-
lution of future disputes.26
An additional concern often raised by those who look with
favor upon the Frye standard is based on the practical need of
litigants in the adversary system that, "a minimal reserve of
experts exists who can critically examine the validity of a sci-
entific determination .... ",27 The underlying premise is that
a scientific technique could be so new and unique so as to
make the opponent unable to counteract this testimony with
his own expert witness. In such a situation, the needs of the
adversary system would not be met. Professor Giannelli has
reasoned "[t]he principle justification for the Frye test . . . is
that it establishes a method for ensuring the reliability of sci-
entific evidence. ' 28 The Supreme Court of Maryland reiter-
ated the same point: "[w]ithout the Frye test or something
similar, the reliability of an experimental scientific technique
is likely to become a central issue in each trial in which it is
1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1037 (1983); Cullin v. State, 565 P.2d 445, 458 (Wyo.
1977).
24. See Matthias, supra note 2, at 541.
25. See M. McCormick, supra note 2, at 883.
26. See, eg., People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 549 P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144
(1976).
27. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
28. See Giannelli, supra note 2, at 1207 (emphasis in original).
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introduced, so long as there remains serious disagreement in
the scientific community over its reliability. 29
Finally, while critics of Frye censure the essentially con-
servative nature of the test, proponents argue this is an advan-
tage, not a drawback, in that it acts to insure against the
admission of unreliable evidence.30
B. Opponents
Antagonists of the Frye "general acceptance" test often fo-
cus their criticism on the conservative nature of the test. As
Professor Giannelli has observed, "the heavy burden de-
manded by the Frye test deprives courts of relevant evi-
dence. ' 31 One court has gone as far as to claim that Frye
thrusts "an unjustifiable obstacle" 32 to the admission of scien-
tific evidence. Constitutional theorists argue that to place
such an "obstacle" before the admission of scientific evidence
may interfere with a defendant's constitutional right to pres-
ent a defense. 33 Frye disputants sense that the "general ac-
ceptance" test acts to exclude otherwise valuable and sound
scientific evidence simply because the evidence is too new or
unique to have had the time or opportunity to meet the "gen-
eral acceptance" standard.34 Some courts question whether
one person's viewpoint could ever be sufficient to attest to the
views of an entire scientific community regarding the reliabil-
29. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 388, 391 A.2d 364, 371 (1978).
30. See Moenssens, supra note 2, at 546.
[Miany courts favor a conservative approach because juries may be overly im-
pressed by experts with seemingly impressive credentials. Additionally, juries
may give greater weight to expert opinions than the opinions deserve on the basis
of scientific validity ....
A conservative test - one that will not permit the prosecution or the defense
to use evidence based on tests of unproven reliability - is especially commenda-
ble in criminal cases, in which the technical inquiry is directed toward resolving
the ultimate issue of guilt.
Id. (footnote omitted).
31. See Symposium Report, supra note 2, at 192.
32. State v. Cantanese, 368 So. 2d 975, 980 (La. 1979).
33. See, eg., McMorris v. Israel, 643 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 102 S.
Ct. 1479 (1982).
34. See generally Boyce, Judicial Recognition of Scientific Evidence in Criminal
Cases, 8 UTAH L. REv. 313 (1964).
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ity of a new technique.35 These courts require that a mini-
mum of two experts testify to corroborate their views because
of the possibility of witness bias. 6 In effect, Frye requires the
passing of a "cultural lag" 37 before the scientific evidence
meets the "general acceptance" standard.38
One further criticism of the conservative nature of the
Frye test is that it seems to be inconsistent with modem laws
of evidence which allow for the liberal admissibility of opinion
evidence.39
Further debate has focused on the vagueness of the "gen-
eral acceptance" language. The Frye standard has been criti-
cized as at best "nebulous."'  Professor Giannelli spoke of the
problems inherent in a vague test:
Courts applying the general acceptance test have discovered
the need to define the parameters of the test more closely
than the D.C. Circuit did in Frye. In particular, courts must
decide who must find the procedure acceptable, they must
define exactly what must be accepted, and they must deter-
mine what methods will be used to establish general
acceptance. 1
In conclusion, one critic has observed what has occurred
in practice when courts have sought to minimize or eliminate
the Frye standard:
35. People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 37, 549 P.2d 1240, 1248, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 152
(1976).
36. Commonwealth v. Topa, 471 Pa. 223, 232, 369 A.2d 1277, 1282 (1977). See
also People v. Tobey, 401 Mich. 141, 145, 257 N.W.2d 537, 539-40 (1977).
37. Maletskos & Spielman, Introduction of New Scientific Methods in Court, LAW
ENFORCEMENT ScI. & TECH. 957, 958 (1967).
38. Proponents of Frye would argue that requiring a novel scientific technique to
pass a "cultural lag" is sound thinking because this will afford the device sufficient time
to be tested and proven effective.
39. See Moenssens, supra note 2, at 560-61. Moenssens points out the inefficiencies
inherent in scientific testing:
[The expansion of techniques and the growth in the number of laboratories have
caused considerable problems. Many laboratories experience difficulty in finding
staff to perform the new functions. Laboratories often hire people who are not
fully qualified or appropriately trained in forensic methodologies. Increasingly,
experts reach erroneous conclusions and make misidentifications even in disci-
plines as old and widespread as fingerprint identification.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Considering the problems inherent in laboratory testing, the logic of retaining a con-
servative test should become more obvious.
40. State v. Hall, 297 N.W.2d 80, 85 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 927 (1981).
41. See Giannelli, supra note 2, at 1208 (emphasis in original).
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As applied, distinguished, or ignored in [these] federal and
state cases, the Frye standard has undergone substantial im-
plicit modification. This process has occurred largely in sit-
uations in which a rigid or literal application of the test
would require reversal of trial court rulings admitting scien-
tific evidence. In these situations the records were obviously
sufficient to persuade appellate courts of the accuracy and
reliability of the principles and techniques involved, despite
absence of total compliance with the Frye standard.42
C. McCormick's Criticism
Perhaps the most frequently cited critic of the Frye "gen-
eral acceptance" test is Professor McCormick in the second
edition of his Handbook of the Law of Evidence:43
"General scientific acceptance" is a proper condition for tak-
ing judicial notice of scientific facts, but not a criterion for
the admissibility of scientific evidence. Any relevant conclu-
sions which are supported by a qualified expert witness
should be received unless there are other reasons for exclu-
sion. Particularly, probative value may be overborne by the
familiar dangers of prejudicing or misleading the jury, and
undue consumption of time. If the courts used this ap-
proach, instead of repeating a supposed requirement of "gen-
eral acceptance" not elsewhere imposed, they would arrive
at a practical way of utilizing the results of scientific
advances. 44
Professor McCormick cited Coppolino v. State45 as a case
critical of Frye and supportive of his "relevancy" approach.
In Coppolino, the jury found the defendant, Dr. Carl Cop-
polino, guilty of second degree murder.46 The defendant, rep-
resented by attorney F. Lee Bailey, appealed. 47 In Coppolino,
the state postulated that the victim, Mrs. Coppolino, had died
as a result of an injection of succinylcholine chloride and
42. See M. McCormick, supra note 2, at 894-95.
43. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, § 203 at 491 (2d ed.
1972).
44. Id. (footnotes omitted).
45. 223 So. 2d 68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968), appeal dismissed mem., 234 So. 2d 120
(Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970).
46. See id. at 69.
47. Id.
1985]
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sought to introduce at trial evidence of a test48 performed by
Dr. Umberger, a toxicologist, to show the presence of this
chemical in the body tissue. The defense presented their own
expert who disagreed as to the validity and accuracy of the
test. The issue on appeal was whether the trial court should
have admitted evidence of the test.
On appeal the court made reference to Frye but held "it is
incumbent for the defendant to show that the trial judge
abused his discretion. This the defendant has failed to do."'49
Despite McCormick's having cited this case as supportive
of his view, commentators have objected to referring to Cop-
polino as repudiating Frye. Professor Gianelli remarked,
"Coppolino thus ignores rather than rejects Frye. More im-
portantly, it neither endorses the McCormick approach nor of-
fers any alternative standard: it merely recognizes trial judge
discretion.' ' 50 Another analyst, Mark McCormick, places crit-
icism of the Frye test by the Coppolino court in perspective:
Because the court did not expressly modify or repudiate
Frye, the decision safely can be read merely as using the
range of trial court discretion as a basis for deferring to the
trial court's application of the general acceptance standard
... . The record contained no evidence of general accept-
ance of the new test. Instead, it showed only that it was
accepted by scientists who testified for the state in the case,
and it was not accepted by the scientists who testified for the
defense. On one level of analysis, therefore, the case might
be interpreted merely as upholding a trial court exercise of
discretion without a legal basis for doing so. The decision,
after all, was made by an intermediate appellate court that
acknowledged it was bound by the Florida Supreme Court's
adoption of the Frye standard. . . . Consequently, the case
became persuasive authority for modifying or abrogating the
very standard that the Coppolino court purported to apply.5 1
Hence, McCormick's reliance on the Coppolino decision as
persuasive authority for overturning Frye seems ill-founded. 2
48. The test which the State introduced to show the presence of succinyicholine
chloride in the tissue of the victim's body was unique and developed specifically for the
Coppolino case. Id. at 75 (Mann, J., concurring specially).
49. Id. at 71.
50. See Giannelli, supra note 2, at 1235 (emphasis added).
51. See M. McCormick supra note 2, at 889-90.
52. See Giannelli, supra note 2, at 1232-34, where Professor Giannelli points out:
[Vol. 69:116
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Accordingly, it is curious to note that, following criticism by
commentators53 of the oft-cited language at page 491 of Mc-
Cormick's second edition, 54 this language does not appear
anywhere in McCormick's 1984 third edition. 5  Therefore,
one might justly conclude that Professor McCormick is re-
treating from the harsh treatment he afforded the Frye rule in
his 1954 text.
IV. THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
In 1975, Congress adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence
for use in federal district courts. 6 The Frye test of "general
[T]his formulation (citing Professor McCormick's oft quoted 1954 text) has gen-
erated some confusion. Several courts have concluded that under the McCor-
mick view, lack of general acceptance plays no part in the trial judge's
determination of admissibility ....
An even more puzzling statement appears in a later section of McCormick's
chapter on scientific evidence. In discussing the polygraph, McCormick refers to
his original comments on the general acceptance test and then observes: "If we
thus deflate the requirement [of general acceptance] to the normal standard
which simply demands that the theory or device be accepted by a substantial
body of scientific opinion, there can be little doubt that the lie-detector meets this
requirement. " This passage seems to propose a "substantial acceptance" stan-
dard, an approach markedly different from the relevancy analysis. Indeed, a sub-
stantial acceptance standard would seem to come close to the Frye general
acceptance standard, requiring the court to identify the field or profession in
which the technique belongs and then to determine whether substantial accept-
ance has been achieved in that field.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
53. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
54. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
55. See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, § 203 (3d ed.
1984).
56. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1296 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
App. A at 539-605) (1976). The applicable Federal Rules of Evidence are as follows:
Fed. R. Evid. 401 provides: "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having
any tendency to make the exsitence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence."
Fed. R. Evid. 402 provides: "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress,
by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to
statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible."
Fed. R. Evid. 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
Fed. R. Evid. 702 provides: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine
1985]
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acceptance" does not appear anywhere in the Congressional
Committee Reports, the Advisory Committee's Notes, or the
hearings themselves. Since the time of their adoption, and as
various states have enacted their version of the rules,57 courts
and commentators have debated the status of the Frye test
under the Federal Rules of Evidence. 8 Professor Giannelli
summarized the arguments from both perspectives pertaining
to whether the federal rules superseded Frye:
[T]hose who argue that the Frye test survived the enact-
ment of the Federal Rules have some support in the legisla-
tive history. Because the Federal Rules were not intended to
be a comprehensive codification of the rules of evidence, a
number of evidentiary rules are not covered, and many
others, though mentioned, are treated only in a general fash-
ion. Therefore, it can be argued that because Frye was the
established rule and no statement repudiating Frye appears
in the legislative history, the general acceptance standard re-
mains intact.
Those who argue that the Federal Rules repeal the Frye
standard focus on the language of the Rules. Rule 401 de-
fines relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence." Rule 402 mandates
that "[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, except as other-
wise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by
Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed
by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority." Be-
cause scientific evidence could be shown to be reliable and
thus relevant under Rule 401 without regard to its general
acceptance in the scientific community, and because none of
a fact in issue, a witness, qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or other-
wise."
Fed. R. Evid. 703 provides: "The facts or data in the particular case upon
which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or
made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon
by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the sub-
ject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence."
Id.
57. See M. McCormick, supra note 2, at 886-87. "[T]wenty-two states and Puerto
Rico now have rules similar to the Federal Rules." (footnote omitted). Additional
states are considering adopting the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. at 887, n.51.
58. See supra note 2.
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the exclusions enumerated in Rule 402 is applicable, the
Federal Rules have provided a standard of admissibility in-
consistent with Frye. Although this argument has consider-
able merit, jurisdictions adopting the Uniform Rules of
Evidence (1953), which contain a similar relevancy provi-
sion, have not accepted the argument. 9
The Federal Rules of Evidence have been construed as be-
ing substantially more liberal in application than the Frye
rule. The reason for this conclusion is that under the federal
rules there is no need to show "general acceptance" within the
scientific community. The proponent need only show that the
evidence is relevant under Rule 401, 60 and successfully defend
any possible challenges6 1 made to the admissibility of the evi-
dence by the opponent.
However, in the interests of justice one must still guard
against the admission of unreliable novel scientific evidence.
Therefore, those who favor the "relevancy approach" point to
the role the adversary plays in his or her cross-examination as
a guard against unreliable scientific evidence. The theory is
that the proponent of unreliable expert evidence will be less
believable in the eyes of the jurors, and the opponent will pre-
vail. But, legal scholars have seriously questioned the logic in
that premise.62
59. See Giannelli, supra note 2, at 1229-30.
60. See supra note 56.
61. Id.
62. See Symposium Report, supra note 2, at 213:
[W]hen an expert testifies, cross-examination may not be quite as useful in high-
lighting problems with his testimony. An expert, such as the one called in Frye,
may not be relying very much on memory. Rarely will the expert be a witness to
the underlying events that gave rise to litigation ....
If the expert had been permitted to testify, his testimony might have influ-
enced the jury. If the machine was proven unreliable, then the jury's verdict
may well have rested on unreliable - i.e., incorrect evidence. In Frye, a guilty
defendant might have gone free. In another case, where the government offered
the evidence, a defendant might have been erroneously convicted. It is one thing
to accept the risk of human error by jurors when the errors are essentially una-
voidable and probably not discernable. It is another to permit a "scientific
claim" when that claim might later be shown to be wrong. Frye sought to mini-
mize reliance on scientific claims that had not yet been sufficiently validated for
courts to feel comfortable in relying on them to render a final judgment.
Id. (emphasis in original).
But see Cullin v. State, 565 P.2d 445, 458 (1977): "[t]he device of cross-examination
soon smokes out the inept, the unlearned, the inadequate self-styled expert." Id.
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Despite the "relevancy approach" taken by some follow-
ing the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, debate is
likely to continue concerning the vitality of Frye under the
rules until state supreme and federal district courts provide
further guidance.
V. THE WISCONSIN APPROACH
Wisconsin's approach to determining the admissibility of
scientific evidence has been uncertain. The Supreme Court of
Wisconsin in State v. Walstad63 admitted to this confusion:
"this court's treatment of Frye [has] not been marked by cer-
tainty or consistency." 64 The resulting haze has left practi-
tioners with the unenviable task of discerning whether to
apply the Frye "general acceptance" standard, or the "rele-
vancy" or "balancing approach."
A. Cases Citing Frye
The first Wisconsin case to make reference to Frye was
State v. Bohner.65 In Bohner, the defendant was charged and
found guilty of bank robbery.66 On appeal Bohner asserted
that "the court erred in refusing to permit the test of a lie
detector to be presented to the jury. ' 67 The defense sought to
introduce the testimony of Professor Keeler, of Northwestern
University Crime Detection Laboratory, to prove that Bohner
could not have been in the city where the robbery took place
on the day in question.
The defense tendered an offer of proof, "that this 'lie de-
tector' has been used in over 10,000 cases and that seventy-five
percent of those upon whom the 'lie detector' has been used
have confessed their guilt upon completion of a second test
with the said 'lie detector'. '6
The court cited and applied the Frye "general acceptance"
test to conclude "[w]e are not satisfied that this instrument,
during the ten years that have elapsed since the decision in the
63. 119 Wis. 2d 483, 351 N.W.2d 469 (1984).
64. Id. at 515, 351 N.W.2d at 485.
65. 210 Wis. 651, 246 N.W. 314 (1933).
66. Id. at 652, 246 N.W. at 315.
67. Id. at 657, 246 N.W. at 317.
68. Id.
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Frye case, has progressed from the experimental to the de-
monstrable state."169
The Bohner court examined the history of the "lie detec-
tor" test and found that the evidence failed to meet the "gen-
eral acceptance" standard and hence excluded the evidence
under Frye.70
The next decision to explicitly71 mention Frye was State v.
Stanislawski.72 Stanislawski had been charged and found
guilty of forcible rape.73 The record from the trial court con-
tained circumstantial evidence which would tend to support a
finding that Stanislawski was innocent.74 In light of this evi-
dence, defense counsel attempted to introduce mitigating evi-
dence obtained through two polygraph examinations which
were administered to the defendant, and the complaining wit-
ness. The offer of proof contained statements which demon-
strated that the tests were conducted by two police officers
who had 34 years of combined experience conducting nearly
2,000 polygraph examinations.75
The results obtained by the examiners indicated that
Stanislawski was telling the truth when he denied having sex-
ual relations with the complaining witness on the date 6f the
69. Id. at 658, 246 N.W. at 317.
70. The Bohner court after citing and applying the Frye test stated its rationale for
excluding evidence of the polygraph:
[w]hile it may have some utility at present and may ultimately be of great value
in the administration ofjustice, it must not be overlooked that a too hasty accept-
ance of it during this stage of its development may bring complications and abuses
that will over-balance whatever utility it may be assumed to have.
Id. (emphasis added)
71. The author contends that the reason there has been confusion in Wisconsin as
to whether practitioners should apply the Frye test or a relevancy approach has been the
selective application of the "general acceptance" language. The Frye test has been used
in Wisconsin without proper citation. See infra notes 125-40 and accompanying text.
72. 62 Wis. 2d 730, 216 N.W.2d 8 (1974).
73. Id. at 732, 216 N.W.2d at 9.
74. For instance, pubic hairs were found on a pair of white mittens worn by the
complaining witness, which did not belong to her, her boyfriend, or the defendant. Pu-
bic hairs were also found in the vaginal area of the alleged victim. These pubic hairs also
did not belong to the victim, her boyfriend, or the defendant. Finally, the defendant
testified that he was already home and in bed when the alleged incident took place and
his testimony was corroborated by his sister. Id. at 733-34, 216 N.W. 2d at 10.
75. Id. at 734, 216 N.W.2d at 10.
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alleged incident.7 6 When the complaining witness was tested,
the outcome led the examiner to conclude
that she was not telling the truth in stating that she had sex-
ual relations with the defendant and in response to questions
as to whether she was trying to protect someone else in the
case and whether she had intercourse with someone other
than the defendant in the late night or early morning hours
of April 25 or 26, 1972.77
The trial court excluded the testimony as to the polygraph
tests and the examiner's conclusions.
The supreme court cited Bohner, and although the court
made reference to McCormick's opposition to the Frye stan-
dard, the court noted that Frye remains "often cited and fol-
lowed."' 78 The Stanislawski court then stated that: "[w]e need
not reject the Frye test to inquire, forty-plus years later,
whether the lack of general acceptance then found to exist,
still persists."' 79 The supreme court went on to admit the evi-
dence obtained via the polygraph test provided certain condi-
tions 80 were met. In referring to the reliability of the
polygraph, the court noted the "increased use and acceptance
[of the polygraph] reflects the establishing of polygraph tests,
conducted by a competent examiner, as having gained 'stand-
ing and scientific recognition among physiological and psy-
chological authorities' in their particular field."8
Stanislawski, therefore, arguably applied Frye to conclude
that polygraphs are now "generally accepted" within the com-
munity of physiological and psychological experts, and that
the case should not be viewed as a repudiation of Frye.8"
76. Id.
77. Id at 735, 216 N.W.2d at 10.
78. Id. at 737, 216 N.W.2d at 10.
79. Id.
80. Stanislawski, now overruled, required that before polygraph evidence would be
admitted the parties involved would have to enter a stipulation agreement. See State v.
Dean, 103 Wis. 2d 228, 307 N.W.2d 628 (1981).
81. Stanislawski, 62 Wis. 2d at 738, 216 N.W.2d at 642, quoting from, State v.
Bohner, 210 Wis. 651, 657, 246 N.W. 314, 317 (1933).
82. But see State v. Dean, 103 Wis. 2d at 242, 307 N.W.2d at 635. The Dean court
takes the position that Stanislawski did not apply the Frye test to determine admissibil-
ity. Rather, the Dean court argues that by entering the Stanislawski stipulation the
parties were estopped from questioning the admissibility of the polygraph results. Id. at
257-58, 307 N.W.2d at 642.
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In 1974, the supreme court was once again faced with a
question involving the admissibility of a novel scientific tech-
nique - hair identification. Watson v. State,83 erroneously re-
ferred to as the first case to reject Frye,84 concerned the
admissibility of hair identification analysis which led to a jury
verdict that John Jospeh Watson was guilty of burglary. On
appeal, the defendant asserted a number of errors, one being
that the testimony of June Browne, hair identification witness
for the State, should have been excluded "because the present
state of the science of identification does not accept the propo-
sition that hair samples can be determined to have come from
a particular individual,"' 5 ergo Frye. The Watson court re-
ferred to State v. Hunt,86 in which the same witness testified
that cat hairs found on the defendant's jacket came from an
animal owned by the victim. 87 Consequently, such evidence
was then used to implicate the defendant. 8
The Watson court reasoned: "[i]n the instant case, as in
Hunt, the defendant had the opportunity to present other evi-
dence that June Browne was out of step with recognized au-
thorities in the art of scientific identification.' ' 89 Accordingly,
although the court cited criticism of the Frye test, it can be
inferred from the above language that an argument based on
the "general acceptance" standard would have been permissi-
ble. The defense having failed to so argue, however, effec-
tively waived the objection.
Seven years passed before the Frye test was once again
mentioned in Wisconsin case law. The defendant in State v.
83. 64 Wis. 2d 264, 219 N.W.2d 398 (1974).
84. See M. McCormick, supra note 2, at 897. The author states "[t]he earliest re-
jection of the Frye standard occurred in Watson v. State, in which the Wisconsin
Supreme Court upheld the admissibility of hair identification testimony." Id. (footnote
omitted). Watson should not be viewed as rejecting Frye because in Watson the defend-
ant could have presented evidence to "show that June Browne was out of step with recog-
nized authorities in the art of scientific identification." See Watson, 64 Wis. 2d at 273,
219 N.W.2d at 403 (emphasis added). Therefore, the defendant could have presented
evidence that the expert failed to meet the "general acceptance" test, but declined to do
so. Consequently, the Frye test was not an issue properly before the court on appeal and
any criticism by the court of Frye should be treated as merely dicta.
85. Watson, 64 Wis. 2d at 272, 219 N.W.2d at 402.
86. 53 Wis. 2d 734, 193 N.W.2d 858 (1972).
87. Watson, 64 Wis. 2d at 272, 219 N.W.2d at 402.
88. Id. at 272-73, 219 N.W.2d at 403.
89. Id. at 273, 219 N.W.2d at 403 (emphasis added).
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Dean90 was charged with, and subsequently found guilty, of
failure to remain at the scene of an accident resulting in in-
jury.91 Dean entered a Stanislawski stipulation 92 and under-
went a polygraph examination which indicated truth
deception in the control questions.
93
The appellate court reversed concluding that the poly-
graph tests should not have been admitted. A hearing had not
been held to determine whether Dean's waiver of his right to
counsel before the stipulation was entered was done "know-
ingly and voluntarily. 94
The supreme court took the opportunity to examine the
wisdom of the Stanislawski stipulation, and although it was
presented with an opportunity to clarify its position regarding
the Frye test, it declined to do so.9 5
The Dean court proceeded to trace the history of the poly-
graph under Frye and concluded that "the Stanislawski condi-
tions are not operating satisfactorily to enhance the reliability
of the polygraph evidence and to protect the integrity of the
trial process as they were intended to do."' 96 The court did not
consider polygraph evidence a question of admissibility under
Frye; rather, the court addressed the issue in terms of admis-
sion by stipulation where the parties have waived their rights
and are estopped from asserting that the polygraph is unrelia-
ble.97 The rationale is that a stipulation does not enhance the
reliability of the polygraph. With the stipulation removed, the
court neglected to address the issue of reliability of scientific
evidence under the Frye "general acceptance" test.98
90. See 103 Wis. 2d 228, 307 N.W.2d 628 (1981).
91. Id. at 229-30, 307 N.W.2d at 629-30.
92. Id. at 229-30, 307 N.W.2d at 629.
93. Id. at 230, 307 N.W.2d at 629.
94. Id. at 231, 307 N.W.2d at 630.
95. Id. at 233, 307 N.W.2d at 631. "We do not however treat this case as the
occasion to examine the Frye. . . standard for admissibility of scientific evidence or the
question of the scientific reliability or acceptability of the theory of the polygraph." Id.
96. Id. at 279, 307 N.W.2d at 653.
97. Id. at 242, 307 N.W.2d at 635.
98. Id. at 251 n.10, 307 N.W.2d at 640 n.10, "[t]here does not seem to be general
acceptance that a pre-test stipulation enhances the reliability of the test." (citation omit-
ted) (emphasis added). This seems to indicate that Frye is alive and well in Wisconsin.
The Dean court merely held that the Stanislawski stipulation was operating ineffec-
tively, not that Frye is inapplicable to scientific evidence. See also infra notes 125-57
and accompanying text.
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Two years following Dean, the supreme court in State v.
Armstrong99 was confronted with the admissibility of "hypnot-
ically affected testimony. ' '"" ° Armstrong had been found
guilty of first degree murder and first degree sexual assault. 101
The key issue was whether the State's use of hypnosis 0 2 to
refresh the recollection of a witness subsequently rendered her
identification of Armstrong in a line-up and in-court testi-
mony inadmissible.1 0 3
When defense counsel criticized the procedure used during
the hypnotic session, the State countered by arguing that the
test administrator "concluded to a reasonable degree of scien-
tific certainty, there was nothing in the hypnotic session that
would have caused Orebia (the State's witness) to identify the
defendant rather than any other person in the line-up. ' 1 4
The court then made inquiry into the scientific validity of
"hypnotically affected testimony," and the effect it could have
on memory. The Armstrong court cited Frye, indicating that
the "general acceptance" test was the appropriate standard for
determining the validity of expert testimony; however, the
court further stated that expert testimony was not at issue in
the case at bar. Therefore, the court determined that Frye is
not applicable to "hypnotically affected testimony," 10 5 and it
99. 110 Wis. 2d 555, 329 N.W.2d 386 (1983), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 946 (1983).
100. See id. at 559, 329 N.W.2d at 389.
101. d at 559, 329 N.W.2d at 389-90.
102. Id. at 563, 329 N.W.2d at 390-91.
In an effort to refresh Ms. Orebia's recollection of the events she had witnessed
on the morning of June 24, 1980, the police asked her to submit to hypnosis.
The hypnosis session was conducted by Doctor Roger A. McKinley five days
after the murder. Prior to being hypnotized, Orebia described the person she
saw as being "pretty well-built", with big arms and a flat stomach, and having
long dark hair. She also was very positive in stating she would be able to identify
the man if she saw him again. She described the car she had seen as white with a
black top and "pretty old."
Under hypnosis, Orebia's description remained substantially the same. She
described the man as having dark, wavy hair covering the back of his neck, and
as being of medium height with big arms, small stomach, fat nose and bushy,
dark eyebrows.
Id.
103. Id. at 559, 329 N.W.2d at 389.
104. Id. at 565, 329 N.W.2d at 391 (emphasis added).
105. Id. at 568, 329 N.W.2d at 393.
[I]n the case of expert testimony deduced from a scientific technique, under Frye,
as an initial matter, it is the technique which is in effect on trial before the court.
However, the trial judge is not required to do an inde-pendent examination as to
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was then not reversible error for the trial court to admit this
testimony.
However, although the court determined Frye was inappli-
cable to this type of evidence, the Armstrong court admitted
that Frye is the "most frequently employed rationale" 106 used
to ban this type of testimony. Also, the court pointed out in a
footnote that "[i]f Frye could be viewed as applicable to this
case, there is a strong argument that the test would be met.
The phenomenon of hypnosis has been accepted by the appro-
priate scientific discipline."10 7 The Armstrong case, therefore,
should not be viewed as tacit approval of the "general accept-
ance" test but as a limitation on its range of application.
B. The Walstad Opinion
The most recent Wisconsin case to discuss the Frye test
was State v. Walstad.08 Walstad was arrested and charged
with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an
intoxicant. Since the defendant had been previously convicted
of the same offense within the past five years, he became sub-
ject upon this conviction to criminal penalties. 109 When Wal-
stad- was arrested he submitted to a breathalyzer test, the
admissibility of which became the basis for the dispute.
The defense moved to have the breathalyzer ampoule pro-
duced in court. The motion was denied, however, because the
test operator, following standard operating procedure, had de-
stroyed the ampoule.110 The defense then moved to suppress
the test results, and the circuit judge denied the motion.1"
the scientific principles which underlie the technique. He does not have to have
experiments conducted in court to verify the reliability of the technique. In-
stead, he evaluates the opinions of people who have spent sufficient time in the
study of the field to qualify as an "expert." If there is a sufficient number of
"experts" who accept the validity of the technique, the judge will allow an expert
to testify regarding deductions he has made from that technique.
Id.
106. Id. at 567, 329 N.W.2d at 392.
107. Id. at 567 n.14, 329 N.W.2d at 393 n.14 (emphasis added). See also id. at 565,
329 N.W.2d at 391, where the court states "[tihe phenomenon of hypnosis is generally
accepted by psychologists." (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Id.
108. 119 Wis. 2d 483, 351 N.W.2d 469 (1984).
109. See id. at 486, 351 N.W.2d at 471.
110. See id. at 487, 351 N.W.2d at 471-72.
111. Id. at 487, 351 N.W.2d at 472. This motion was made 43 days after the test
ampoule was taken.
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Thereafter, Walstad pleaded no contest and brought an
appeal.1 12
The supreme court upheld the trial court's finding of fact
that "a used ampoule - even had it been produced - could
not have supplied evidence material to the guilt or innocence
of the accused. Accordingly, the trial court, on the basis of
the facts, correctly denied the defendant's motion to sup-
press."1 13  Justice Heffernan, writing for the majority,
could have ended his inquiry at this point. He went on, how-
ever, to reprehend the trial court's use of Frye:
[T]his case has never been explicitly accepted in Wisconsin
and, in fact, has been explicitly rejected. The trial judge
erred when he stated that he was "constrained by the princi-
ples elucidated.in Frye. . ." and he was incorrect when he
stated the Frye test was the accepted standard for the admis-
sibility of scientific testimony. We hasten to add, however,
that this court's treatment of Frye has not been marked by
certainty or consistency.114
The supreme court then undertook a historical survey of
those Wisconsin cases which addressed the Frye standard. Be-
ginning with the Bohner decision, the Walstad court con-
cluded that Bohner cited Frye because it was the only
polygraph case then in existence "and [it] was not cited to
import a new test of admissibility into Wisconsin law. '11 5
Turning to the Stanislawski decision, after having ad-
dressed the conditional admissibility of polygraph examina-
tions subject to the stipulations cited by the Stanislawski
court, Justice Heffernan wrote:
[T]hus, while this court in Stanislawski thought it necessary
to dispel the phantom holding of the Frye dicta in Bohner, it
neither expressly ratified nor expressly rejected Frye. It con-
ditionally accepted polygraph testimony on newly articu-
lated public policy grounds, i.e., that the polygraph evidence
was used as a lie detecting device in various human pursuits
and testimony derived from polygraph tests appeared to
compare favorably with other types of expert testimony.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 514, 351 N.W.2d at 485.
114. Id. at 515, 351 N.W.2d at 485 (emphasis added).
115. Id. at 516-17, 351 N.W.2d at 486.
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Stanislawski, however, did not accept nor reject Frye. That
determination was unnecessary to the decision.116
Finally, the Walstad court examined Watson. Although
hair identification of this kind was not shown to be "generally
accepted" within any particular scientific community, the
Watson court had admitted the evidence and relied on cross-
examination and impeachment to show whether the evidence
was reliable. Credibility thus becomes a question for the
factfinder, and if the testimony is relevant it is admissible. 117
The Walstad court concluded by stating, "Frye was clearly
and unequivocally repudiated in Watson,""' 8 and "[ilt is clear
therefore, that the trial judge's reliance upon Frye does not find
support in the law of evidence of Wisconsin."1 1 9
VI. CRITIQUE
Contrary to the opinion expressed by Justice Heffernan in
Walstad concerning Frye,120 the "general acceptance" test is
not unfamiliar to the Wisconsin law of evidence."' The final
section of this article will demonstrate that Wisconsin has re-
lied on the Frye "general acceptance" test in the past,'22 and
that the Frye standard has been adopted by the Seventh Cir-
cuit. 123 Additionally, Frye is currently the best available
guarantee against the admission of unreliable, unproven, novel
scientific techniques. 24
A. The Frye Concept is Not Foreign to Wisconsin Case Law
An earlier section of this article dealt with cases which
have explicitly cited Frye.125 However, there are a number of
other Wisconsin cases which have applied the Frye "general
acceptance" language without citing to the case. These cases
116. Id. at 517-18, 351 N.W.2d at 486.
117. Id. at 519, 351 N.W.2d at 487.
118. Id. (emphasis added).
119. Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
120. Id. at 516, 351 N.W.2d at 86. ("The Frye concept is alien to the Wisconsin
law of evidence.")
121. See infra notes 126-37 and accompanying text.
122. See id.
123. See infra notes 143-52 and accompanying text.
124. See infra notes 153-57 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 65-119 and accompanying text.
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provide further evidence that the "general acceptance" test is
not foreign to Wisconsin case law.
In 1959, Puhl v. Milwaukee Automobile Insurance Co.126
came before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. This case in-
volved an automobile accident in which Theresa Puhl, three
months pregnant, was injured.1 27 Theresa later gave birth to
Mary Ann, the plaintiff, who was born with Down's Syn-
drome.1 28 One of the evidentiary issues involved the admissi-
bility of the testimony of Dr. Schuenzel that "mongolism
could be caused by a lack of oxygen to the fetus about the
thirteenth week of pregnancy."1 29 Dr. Schuenzel testified that
he did not qualify as an expert or specialist in the causes of
mongolism, 130 but "it was his opinion to a reasonable medical
certainty that the accident caused Mary Ann to be born a
mongoloid.' 31 The medical theory was that the car accident
"loosened"1 32 the mother's placenta thereby decreasing the
amount of oxygen available to the fetus, which, when com-
bined with the "emotional upset,"' 133 caused a secretion of hor-
mones inhibiting the child's development.134
The opposing expert also admitted that he lacked expertise
in the area of Down's Syndrome but felt that the mother's age
was a significant contributing factor to the child's condition.
He also added that there was no known specific cause of
Down's Syndrome although many theories attempted to ex-
plain the cause.' 35
The Puhl court, when faced with the dilemma of whether
or not to admit the medical testimony as to causation, found
guidance in Frye:
The opinion of Dr. Schuenzel as to the cause of Mary
Ann's Mongolism was not based on clear and convincing ev-
idence that such cause of Mongolism was the consensus of
medical and scientific opinion ....
126. 8 Wis. 2d 343, 99 N.W.2d 163 (1959).
127. Id. at 345, 99 N.W.2d at 165.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 351, 99 N.W.2d at 168.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 352, 99 N.W.2d at 168.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 352-53, 99 N.W.2d at 168.
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When scientific or medical theories or explanations have
not crossed the line and become an accepted medical fact,
opinions based thereon are no stronger or convincing than
the theories. While this court has gone a long way in admit-
ting expert testimony deduced from well-recognized scien-
tific and medical principles or discoveries, nevertheless, the
facts from which the opinion is made must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particu-
lar medical field in which they belong. Otherwise, the opin-
ion is based not on facts but conjecture. 13 6
A comparison of the above language with an analogous ex-
cerpt from Frye reveals the court's adoption of the Frye
standard:
[J]ust when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line
between the experimental and demonstrable stages is diffi-
cult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential
force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts
will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced
from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the
thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particu-
lar field in which it belongs. 137
There should be no doubt from a comparison of the lan-
guage used by the courts in these two cases that Puhl applied
the Frye "general acceptance" test to determine that the the-
ory advanced by Dr. Schuenzel failed to demonstrate suffi-
cient "general acceptance" to support a damage award to
Mary Ann. 138
This case manifests the significance of Frye's ability to ex-
clude unreliable scientific testimony. The trial court had ac-
cepted the testimony of Dr. Schuenzel, and the factfinder,
according great weight to the expert testimony, awarded
Mary Ann $50,000 for loss of her physical and mental facul-
ties. 139 However, the supreme court applied the Frye test to
deny recovery. 14 In 1959, the same year Puhl was decided, a
medical report was released which stated that the cause of
136. Id. at 353-54, 99 N.W.2d at 169.
137. Frye, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
138. Puhl, 8 Wis. 2d 343, 354, 99 N.W.2d 163, 169.
139. Id. at 345, 99 N.W.2d at 165.
140. Id. at 354, 99 N.W.2d at 169.
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Down's Syndrome is the presence of an abnormal amount of
chromosomes, not events which occur after conception. 141
Because Dr. Schuenzel's testimony failed to gain "general
acceptance" within the appropriate medical community, his
testimony was rejected by the court. Without the substantial
protection afforded by the Frye rule, unreliable medical and
scientific testimony - such as was advanced by Dr. Schuenzel
in Puhl, are likely to be accepted by a court. Such evidence
could have a prejudicial effect on the jury. It is also notewor-
thy that although Puhl is the seminal case for having referred
to the Frye language without proper citation, other Wisconsin
cases have followed a similar approach. 142
141. The long list of these possible causes shows that no specific maternal anom-
aly could be held responsible. Advanced maternal age remains an etiologic fac-
tor but it acts in a more subtle way than anticipated by early investigators.
Many of these explanations were misleading because they blamed adverse events
during pregnancy for the disorder. They promised that good care afforded the
mother during pregnancy could eradicate the disease, a belief that led to many
disappointments. There were legal implications, too, when accidents during the
sixth or seventh week of pregnancy were adjudged to be the cause of the anomaly
and awards were paid as compensation for injuries which had nothing to do with
the child's Down's Syndrome.
This was the confusing status in 1958 when we prepared the conference on
the etiology of Down's Syndrome in Cincinnati, but the situation was changed
by the time we actually met in 1959. By then it had been announced by Lejeune
and co-workers that in nine mongoloid children cells from tissue cultures
showed 47 chromosomes instead of the normal 46. And it was shown that in
most cases of Down's Syndrome trisomy 21 could be demonstrated. This discov-
ery was a decisive step forward. Many of the old theories could be discarded,
particularly those that explained the disorder on the basis of events weeks after
conception. Other theories which had been vague and too general before were
now confirmed in a more specific way. The presence of extra chromosomal ma-
terial in every cell of the patient with Down's Syndrome appeared to be the
solution of the entire problem.
Warkany, M.D., Etiology of Down's Syndrome, 2 RESEARCH, PREVENTION & MAN-
AGEMENT 9, 11-14 (1975).
142. See In re Adoption of R.P.R., 95 Wis. 2d 573, 590, 291 N.W.2d 591, 600 (Ct.
App. 1980) (court cites Puhl language), rev'd on other grounds, In re Adoption of
R.P.R., 98 Wis. 2d 613, 297 N.W.2d 883 (1980); Schulz v. St. Mary's Hospital, 81 Wis.
2d 638, 651 n.9, 260 N.W.2d 783, 787, n.9 (1978) (court cites Puhl language); City of
Seymour v. Industrial Comm., 25 Wis. 2d 482, 487, 131 N.W.2d 323, 325 (1964) (court
cites Puhl language). See also State v. Trailer Serv. Inc., 61 Wis. 2d 400, 408, 212
N.W.2d 683, 688 (1973). "A scientific or medical method not recognized as acceptable
in the scientific or medical discipline as accurate does not enjoy the presumption of
accuracy." (citations omitted). Id.
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B. The Seventh Circuit has Explicitly Accepted Frye in the
Tranowski Opinion
In United States v. Tranowski,143 the defendant Walter
Tranowski was convicted of perjury. 144 The perjury convic-
tion stemmed from an earlier trial in which Walter's brother,
Stanley, had been accused of tendering a counterfeit five dollar
bill. Stanley's defense focused on Walter's testimony that dur-
ing the alleged counterfeit exchange, Walter had taken a pho-
tograph of his brother, and remained with him until 7:25 p.m.
that evening.145 If Walter's statement was accepted as true, it
would effectively establish an alibi for Stanley. 146
The case concerned the admissibility of a novel scientific
technique. The government sought to discredit Walter's testi-
mony by offering their key witness, astronomer Larry Cipuik,
to prove that the picture taken by Walter could not have been
taken on the day the alleged counterfeit exchange took place.
Ciupik testified as to his theory
that if one knew the compass orientation of an object in a
photograph, it would be possible to date that photograph by:
1) measuring the directional angle of the shadow cast by that
object to determine the azimuth of the sun; and 2) measuring
the angle of elevation of a complete shadow cast by another
object in the photograph to determine the altitude of the
sun. 147
The method employed by Ciupik was novel because to the
best of his knowledge no one had ever used the technique
prior to trial for the purpose of dating a photograph. 148
The Tranowski court made reference to Federal Rules of
Evidence 702 and 703,149 and the ordinarily wide discretion
given the trial judge to admit or deny the assistance of expert
testimony. The court reasoned, "we believe that the technol-
ogy Ciupik relied on was not 'sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field to which it
143. 659 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1981).
144. Id. at 751.
145. Id. at 752.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 753 (footnotes omitted).
148. Id. at 754.
149. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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belongs'. '150 The court made it clear that it was not rejecting
this testimony merely because it was a case of first impression:
"[o]ur rejection is addressed to Ciupik's application of that
theory to the photograph in question. This should not be sur-
prising since neither Ciupik nor anyone else to his knowledge
had ever attempted this procedure before."1 51
The Tranowski court realized that Frye did not require the
trial court to become a "scientific laboratory."1 52 However, it
also recognized that the defendant must not be deprived of his
liberty and be subjected to the stigma of a criminal conviction
on the basis of an untried test which had failed to gain a level
of "general acceptance."
The Tranowski case is significant for two reasons. First,
the court clearly applied the Frye "general acceptance" test to
exclude Ciupik's testimony, thereby binding the Seventh Cir-
cuit to Frye. Second, the opinion discusses Frye in conjunc-
tion with the Federal Rules of Evidence, which indicate that
Frye is in effect in this circuit as well.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Frye "general acceptance" test remains, at present,
the best guarantee against the admission of unreliable, novel
scientific techniques. The test erects a substantial barrier to
the admission of unproven techniques with dubious reliability.
While this test will sometimes act to prevent the admissibility
of otherwise relevant evidence, the significance of admitting
only reliable evidence should not be underestimated:
[t]rials involve disputes, but they do more. They are sym-
bols. Our system of litigation has endeavored to convince
litigants and observers that it operates as fairly as human
beings can to resolve disputes on the basis of reliable evi-
dence carefully considered by the trier of fact, .... When
the question is asked of an expert, "Do other scientists or
experts support the claim you make?" and the answer is
"no", a court that permits a jury to accept and weigh that
claim asks it to do what it is not equipped to do. And in the
process it detracts from the image of a trial as a forum in
150. Tranowski, 659 F.2d at 756 (quoting Frye v. United States, 293 F.2d 1013,
1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923)).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 757.
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which the jury and judge consider only evidence that reason-
able people rely on and are capable of relying on ....
But courts do no disservice to the scientific community
when they refuse to accept evidence based upon scientific
theories and principles without even minimal scientific ac-
ceptance. Because courts are not free to change their minds
down the road as to the results of a particular case, they
need to know that a scientific principle is accepted and the
extent to which it is accepted before they use it to resolve a
dispute once and for all.'53
Wisconsin has applied the Frye test in the past to issues
involving the admission of novel scientific techniques. On oc-
casion, Frye has been accompanied by proper citation, 54 other
times the court has merely borrowed the "general acceptance"
language.'55 Additionally, in Tranowski, the Seventh Circuit
explicitly accepted Frye.5 6 Litigants need to have their dis-
putes settled as fairly as possible. Attorneys and trial judges
need to know that the evidence upon which the case is deter-
mined is the most reliable and trustworthy available. The im-
age of the judicial system is enhanced when disputes are
settled on the basis of dependable evidence. At the present
time, the Frye test is the standard most capable of fulfilling
these needs.' 5 7
GARY J. VAN DOMELEN
153. See Symposium Report, supra note 2, at 217-18.
154. See supra notes 65-119 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 125-40 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 143-52 and accompanying text.
157. See Note, Expert Testimony, supra note 2, at 884-86. The "balancing test,"
the alternative to Frye, is not a viable alternative to the "general acceptance" test. The
former test fails to assure the opponent of the novel scientific technique that he will be
able to find a rebuttal expert. Lack of an opposing expert will not render the evidence
inadmissible under the "balancing approach." Similarly, the "balancing test" unfairly
shifts the burden of proof to the opponent of the novel technique to show the evidence
would be of the type to confuse, mislead, or prejudice the jury.
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